Nos. 06-84 & 06-100

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

CHARLES BURR, *et al.*,

Respondents.

GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, *et al.*,

Petitioners,

v.

AJENE EDO,

Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA AS *AMICUS CURIAE* IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

SUSAN M. POPIK
Counsel of Record
MERRI A. BALDWIN
CHAPMAN, POPIK & WHITE LLP
650 California Street, 19th Floor
San Francisco, California 94108
(415) 352-3000
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae

204755

COUNSEL PRESS
(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS i

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES iii

TABLE OF APPENDICES v

INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE* 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 2

ARGUMENT 3

A. The "Minimum Requirements" for a Valid Adverse Action Notice Announced by the Ninth Circuit Are Not Supported by the Statutory Language and Are Inconsistent with the Governing Agency's Interpretation. 3

1. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Section 1681m Conflicts with the Statutory Language and Has No Support in the Case Law. 3

2. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Section 1681m Conflicts with That of the Federal Trade Commission, the Agency Charged with Enforcing FCRA. 6

B. The Ninth Circuit's Notice Requirements Do Not Further FCRA's Purposes and Impose an Unreasonable Administrative and Economic Burden on Insurers. 8

Contents

Page

C. The Decision Below Seriously Threatens the Continued Availability and Affordability of Personal Lines Insurance. 11

D. The Ninth Circuit's Conclusions on Notice and Willfulness Are Inconsistent with FCRA's Intent and Threaten to Subject the Insurance Industry to Potentially Crippling Penalties. . 13

CONCLUSION 15

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Cushman v. Trans Union Corp.,
115 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 1997) 14

Duncan v. Handmaker,
149 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 1998) 14

Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,
708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983) 6, 7

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
444 U.S. 555 (1980) 10-11

Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Information Co.,
45 F.3d 1329 (9th Cir. 1995) 8

McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.,
486 U.S. 128 (1988) 13

Myers v. Bennett Law Offices,
238 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2001) 3

Phillips v. Grendahl,
312 F.3d 357 (8th Cir. 2002) 14

Reynolds v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.,
435 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) 3, 5, 8, 14

Trans World Airlines, *Inc. v. Thurston*,
469 U.S. 111 (1985) 13

Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States
437 U.S. 443 (1978) 8

Page

FEDERAL STATUTES

15 U.S.C. § 1681 1

15 U.S.C. § 1681a 3, 4, 8

15 U.S.C. § 1681b 3, 8, 15

15 U.S.C. § 1681e 7

15 U.S.C. § 1681m . . . . *passim*

15 U.S.C. § 1681n 13, 14

15 U.S.C. § 1681o 13

15 U.S.C. § 1681s 7

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

16 C.F.R. Part 601, App. C 7

OTHER SOURCES

"FTC Facts for Business: Consumer Reports – What Insurers Need to Know" (FTC October 1998) . . . 7

FTC Staff Opinion Letter, dated November 10, 1998 7

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Page

Appendix A – "FTC Facts for Business: Consumer Reports – What Insurers Need to Know" (FTC October 1998) 1a

Appendix B – FTC Staff Opinion Letter, dated November 10, 1998 . . . . 4a

Property Casualty Insurers Association of America ("PCI") respectfully submits this *amicus curiae* brief in support of petitioners GEICO General Insurance Company, GEICO Indemnity Company, and Government Employees Insurance Company; and Safeco Insurance Company of America, American States Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois, and Safeco Insurance Company of Oregon (collectively "petitioners").[1]

INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE*

PCI is a trade group dedicated to representing its member companies' interests before governmental bodies and state and federal courts. PCI's members include more than 1,000 property and casualty insurance companies that together account for $184 billion in direct written premiums, including 52% of all personal auto premiums and 39.6% of all homeowners premiums written in the United States.

PCI is familiar with the issues involved in this case, including the issues raised in petitioners' briefs. As those briefs demonstrate, this case presents several issues of first impression relating to the interpretation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 *et seq.*, each of which is of critical importance to PCI's members and to the insurance industry as a whole. PCI and its member companies thus have a substantial interest in the outcome of the present action.

In PCI's view, one aspect of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in particular bears further briefing: the required contents of a valid adverse action notice under 15 U.S.C. § 1681m. PCI believes

1. No counsel for any party authored this *amicus* brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other than PCI made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief. All parties have consented to the filing of this *amicus* brief, and their letters are on file with the Clerk of this Court.

its *amicus* brief will be helpful to the Court in offering a somewhat different approach to this issue than do the parties' briefs and in providing data that underscore the significant negative consequences to the insurance industry and the insurance-buying public if the Ninth Circuit's opinion is allowed to stand.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Ninth Circuit's opinion fashions entirely new content requirements for adverse action notices that threaten the very solvency of the insurance industry. These unprecedented requirements are unsupported by any authority and conflict with both the express language of 15 U.S.C. § 1681m ("section 1681m") and Federal Trade Commission directives written for the express purpose of advising insurers of their obligations under FCRA. These new notice requirements are vague in their scope and application and, given the realities of modern insurance underwriting practices, may be virtually impossible for insurers to satisfy. Moreover, imposition of these requirements threatens the insurance industry with potentially ruinous penalties and the prospect of continued litigation, especially when combined with the court of appeals' expansive, and erroneous, definition of "willfulness."

The detailed notice requirements adopted by the Ninth Circuit will also thwart one of Congress's primary objectives in enacting FCRA, which is to provide consumers with clear, intelligible information concerning their credit reports.

ARGUMENT

A. The "Minimum Requirements" for a Valid Adverse Action Notice Announced by the Ninth Circuit Are Not Supported by the Statutory Language and Are Inconsistent with the Governing Agency's Interpretation.

According to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, in order to comply with section 1681m, an adverse action notice must, "at a minimum, . . . communicate to the consumer that an adverse action based on a consumer report was taken, describe the action, specify the effect of the action upon the consumer, and identify the party or parties taking the action." *Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Serv. Group, Inc.*, 435 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006); *see id.* at 1100. These hitherto unknown requirements conflict with the express language of the statute, run afoul of the dictates of prior case law, and are patently inconsistent with Federal Trade Commission advisory directives written specifically to inform insurers of their obligations under FCRA.

1. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Section 1681m Conflicts with the Statutory Language and Has No Support in the Case Law.

The dual purposes of FCRA are to ensure the accuracy and fairness of credit reporting. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a). More specifically, the Act is "intended to safeguard against the improper reporting of information on a credit report (either by the credit reporting agency or by the furnisher of credit information) and against the improper disclosure of a credit report." *Myers v. Bennett Law Offices*, 238 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001); *see* 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (noting that one of FCRA's purposes is "to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit . . . information in a manner which is fair

and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information").

In aid of this goal, section 1681m sets forth specific requirements for users of consumer reports. That section provides that any person who takes adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in a "consumer report"[2] shall issue provide three specific types of information to the consumer, in "oral, written, or electronic" form: (1) notice of the adverse action; (2) contact information for the consumer reporting agency (together with a statement that the reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and cannot provide information concerning the action); and (3) notice of the consumer's right to obtain a copy of the consumer report and to dispute the accuracy or completeness of any information in the report.[3] 15 U.S.C. § 1681m.

---

2. The Act broadly defines "consumer report" as any communication by a consumer reporting agency "bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used . . . as a factor in determining the consumer's eligibility for," among other things, "insurance . . . to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes[.]" 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).

3. Section 1681m(a) provides:

> If any person takes any adverse action with respect to any consumer that is based in whole or in part on any information contained in a consumer report, the person shall–
>
> (1) provide oral, written, or electronic notice of the adverse action to the consumer;
>
> (2) provide to the consumer orally, in writing, or electronically–

(Cont'd)

In considering whether the adverse action notices at issue here met these requirements, the Ninth Circuit went well beyond the mandate of the statute. Rather, as noted above, the court concluded that a valid notice must, "at a minimum," specifically state that an adverse action was taken; "describe" the action; "specify the effect" of the action on the consumer; and "identify the party or parties taking the action, and their respective role." *Reynolds,* 435 F.3d at 1095; *see id.* at 1100. None of these content requirements is found in section 1681m itself, and none can fairly be implied from the language of the statute. Further, the court imposed these requirements on its own, without any party briefing the issue.

(Cont'd)

(A) the name, address, and telephone number of the consumer reporting agency (including a toll-free telephone number established by the agency if the agency compiles and maintains files on consumers on a nationwide basis) that furnished the report to the person; and

(B) a statement that the consumer reporting agency did not make the decision to take the adverse action and is unable to provide the consumer the specific reasons why the adverse action was taken; and

(3) provide to the consumer an oral, written, or electronic notice of the consumer's right–

(A) to obtain, under section 1681j of this title, a free copy of a consumer report on the consumer from the consumer reporting agency referred to in paragraph (2), which notice shall include an indication of the 60-day period under that section for obtaining such a copy; and

(B) to dispute, under section 1681i of this title, with a consumer reporting agency the accuracy or completeness of any information in a consumer report furnished by the agency.

In support of its holding, the Ninth Circuit cited only *Fischl v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.*, 708 F.2d 143, 150 (5th Cir. 1983), a case that has virtually nothing to do with the issues involved here. In that case, Fischl applied for credit to finance the bulk of the purchase price of an automobile. The credit application was referred to General Motors Acceptance Corp. ("GMAC"), which obtained a consumer report on Fischl. After reviewing the application and consumer report, GMAC determined that credit should not be extended. It then sent Fischl a form letter advising him that his application had been rejected on the ground that "credit references are insufficient." In the portion of the letter designed to disclose the use of information from outside sources, GMAC marked "disclosure inapplicable." *Id.* at 145. Fischl subsequently learned that GMAC had in fact obtained his credit information and filed suit under FCRA.

Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit held that GMAC's purported notice failed to comply with section 1681m, since it misleadingly stated "disclosure inapplicable" instead of informing Fischl that GMAC had in fact relied on a consumer report in denying Fischl's loan application. *Id.* at 150. But that is all the *Fischl* opinion says: Other than to make plain that an adverse action notice cannot contain *untrue* information, the case does not even address the required content of such a notice – much less hold that an adverse action notice is invalid unless it contains the specific and detailed information required by the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, other than the Ninth Circuit here, no court in the country has ever interpreted section 1681m to impose such onerous requirements.

2. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation of Section 1681m Conflicts with That of the Federal Trade Commission, the Agency Charged with Enforcing FCRA.

In 1996, Congress enacted amendments to the FCRA which directed the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") – the

agency primarily responsible for enforcing FCRA (*see* 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(a); *Fischl*, 708 F.2d at 149 n.4) – to prescribe the content of notices and to provide a sample notice for users of credit reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(d)(2). In response, the FTC has specifically addressed what information an insurer must provide a consumer in an adverse action notice. In stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, both the FTC's regulations and its advisory materials essentially track the express language of the statute and state that, to be effective, an insurer's adverse action notice need only include "the name, address, and telephone number" of the agency supplying the report; "a statement that the credit reporting agency that supplied the report did not make the decision to take its adverse action"; and a notice of the consumer's right to dispute the information. *See* 16 C.F.R. Part 601, App. C.; "FTC Facts for Business: Consumer Reports – What Insurers Need to Know" (FTC October 1998) (reproduced at PCI's Appendix ("PCI App.") at 1a); *see also* FTC Staff Opinion Letter, dated November 10, 1998, PCI App. at 4a (opining that section 615(a) of FCRA requires adverse action notices to contain "only the information specified" in the statute). Although this interpretation is not technically binding,[4] this Court has often held that considerable

4. In *Fischl*, the Fifth Circuit summarized the FTC's role in interpreting FCRA as follows:

> Although it does not possess substantive rule-making power, the FTC is authorized to enforce the FCRA, "except to the extent that enforcement . . . is specifically committed to some other government agency under [§ 1681s(b)]. . . ." §15 U.S.C. 1681s(a). . . . Due to the absence of express statutory authority to issue binding interpretations of the FCRA, which effectively deprives any such interpretation of the force of law, opinions disseminated by the FTC, whether in the form of its compliance manual or unofficial staff letters, are intended only to clarify the FCRA and are advisory in nature. *These opinions may nonetheless offer helpful guidance to the courts*.

708 F.2d at 149 n.4 (emphasis added).

respect should be accorded the "interpretation given [a] statute by the offices or agencies charged with its administration." *Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States*, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978) (quoting *Udall v. Tallmar*, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1961)).

Prior to the decision below, no court had ever suggested, much less held, that an adverse action notice must contain the detailed content required by the Ninth Circuit. Nor can such a requirement be gleaned from a fair reading of FCRA itself. To the contrary, the only source of specific information concerning the "official" interpretation of this aspect of FCRA – the FTC's regulations and the advisory materials written specifically for insurers – detail a much simpler and straightforward response to consumers in the event of adverse action.

B. The Ninth Circuit's Notice Requirements Do Not Further FCRA's Purposes and Impose an Unreasonable Administrative and Economic Burden on Insurers.

As noted above, one of the primary goals of section 1681m is "to promote the accuracy of information in a consumer credit report." *Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co.*, 45 F.3d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1995); *see* 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a), (b). The Ninth Circuit's newly imposed "minimum" requirements are of no assistance whatever in achieving that end. To the contrary, and in contrast to the statutory requirements, the Ninth Circuit's requirements will serve only to deluge consumers with a quantity of information far removed from that intended by Congress – specifically, information designed to enable them to determine whether their credit information is accurate and, if not, how to correct it. At the same time, the new requirements impose an enormous operational burden on insurers.

Take, for example, the Ninth Circuit's requirement that the notice "specify the effect of the [adverse] action upon the consumer." *Reynolds*, 435 F.3d at 1095. This requirement is

impermissibly vague in scope and application, since it is impossible to determine what the phrase "specify the effect" means or what level of detail is necessary to satisfy this criterion.[5] Moreover, assuming an insurer could overcome this threshold hurdle, the complexities of modern insurance underwriting are such that many insurers will simply be unable to provide the information apparently required by the Ninth Circuit – or at least to do so in a form that consumers will understand.

To be sure, some insurers may use credit information in such a straightforward way that the "effect" of the adverse action will be easy to discern and explain – such as when an insured's premium rate is increased solely and directly because of information in his or her credit report. More often, however, the role of consumer reports in the rating process is much more complicated and nuanced, having both direct and indirect ramifications.

Insurance companies calculate premiums using various underwriting or rating factors. These factors can be affected in numerous ways by information contained in consumer reports. For example, many insurers use consumer report information to calculate an "insurance score," which is then used to place an applicant in a basic risk category or "tier," such as "preferred," "standard," or "nonstandard." Each of these tiers may have associated rating factors and may also, in turn, determine what other rating parameters are applied. Thus, the fact of a speeding violation (information that itself comes from a consumer report) may affect the "preferred" risk tier differently than the "nonstandard" risk tier. Similarly, an applicant's insurance score may determine whether an applicant is eligible for certain discounts or surcharges and, if so, the amount of those discounts and surcharges. This interaction among the various factors that

5. Thus, far from providing guidance as to FCRA compliance, the Ninth Circuit's notice requirements threaten to open a Pandora's box of new litigation.

go into the setting of premiums could make it literally impossible for an insurer to "specify the effect" of the "action" taken as a result of information derived from an individual policyholder's consumer reports.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that insurers may use information from a number of consumer reports (e.g., credit reports, motor vehicle reports, and others) in setting a premium or determining eligibility for coverage, making any meaningful explanation of the "effect" of the reports virtually impossible. Suppose, for example, a policyholder has "good" credit (as derived from a credit report) and one speeding violation. Through sophisticated statistical techniques, an insurer might be able to derive the *overall* rate impact of these two factors combined, but not be able to separate the impact of the good credit, on the one hand, and the speeding violation, on the other. Just how is the carrier to "specify the effect" of its action in these circumstances? And how is the consumer to understand this information as provided?

Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's requirement that an adverse action notice "identify the party or parties taking the action and their respective roles" has little to do with the ultimate aim of alerting consumers to their right to inspect their credit reports and, ultimately, to ensure accurate reporting. Because this new requirement could be read to require independent notices from affiliated companies, many consumers would receive multiple notices, as well as lengthier and more complex notices.

The end result is that, to satisfy the Ninth Circuit's notice requirements, insurers may be forced to provide consumers with an extremely complicated description of their underwriting practices, corporate structure and business practices. As noted by this Court in the context of disclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act, "meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure." *Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,* 444 U.S. 555,

568 (1980). Far from requiring clear, intelligible information designed to assist a consumer in determining whether his or her credit information is accurate and to correct it if it is not, the Ninth Circuit's opinion mandates a form of notice that is so complex and detailed that the key information contemplated by the statute will be all but lost.

C. The Decision Below Seriously Threatens the Continued Availability and Affordability of Personal Lines Insurance.

The Ninth Circuit's notice requirements could have a potentially devastating impact on the insurance industry, since insurers have for years sent out notices that could be construed to fall short of the Ninth Circuit's newly-minted requirements. Combined with the broad standard of "willfulness" adopted by the court (discussed further below), the Ninth Circuit's notice requirements could subject many insurers to statutory liabilities of staggering proportions.

According to industry data, it is estimated that, in 2005, the number of personal lines policies subject to credit scoring (including both new business and renewals) exceeded 71.5 million.[6] While there are no data stating how many adverse action

---

6. This figure was derived using public information, beginning with the latest personal auto and homeowners exposure counts from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners for those states where credit information is allowed. Because each insured automobile constitutes an "exposure," even though more than one auto may be insured on a single policy, the total number of "exposures" was extrapolated and converted into policy counts using data from the Federal Highway Administration and the U.S. Census Bureau. The total policy counts (176.4 million) were then reduced to include only those policies for which credit history was examined. The factors used to generate the final numbers and their sources are as follows:

- Proportion of companies known to use insurance scoring - Michigan Office of Financial and Insurance Services;

(Cont'd)

notices insurers sent during this same time period, it may conservatively be assumed that approximately 50% of these policies triggered such notices.[7] Based on these assumptions, insurers sent some 35.7 million adverse action notices in 2005 alone, *not* including those sent when an application was denied. Assuming that similar numbers of adverse action notices were sent in each of the past five years, carriers have sent approximately 178.5 million adverse action notices since 2001 – many of which could conceivably be vulnerable to *ex post facto* scrutiny based on the Ninth Circuit's newly imposed notice requirements.

(Cont'd)

- Percentage of the largest auto companies using credit scoring models - Conning & Company;
- Percentage of companies using credit data on new business - Conning & Company;
- Retention ratios (applied to develop breakdown between new business and policy renewals) - Ward Financial Group; and
- Frequency with which renewal policy counts are subject to credit (three years) - National Conference of Insurance Legislators' Model Act Regarding Use of Credit Information in Personal Insurance

These percentages and ratios were then applied to the total policy counts to determine the estimated new and renewal policies affected by the use of credit-based insurance scoring.

7. These percentages obscure the fact that, generally speaking, the use of credit information and other consumer reports enables carriers to charge *lower* rates overall than would otherwise be the case. Thus, a carrier's actions in an individual case might trigger an adverse action notice (e.g., where the applicant's credit standing results in an "increased" premium), even though the applicant is charged less than if the carrier had calculated the premium using a different set of factors that did not include credit information.

FCRA provides for statutory damages of between $100 and $1000 per willful violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a). The Ninth Circuit's overreaching interpretation of FCRA's notice requirements thus potentially exposes the insurance industry to statutory damages alone (not including punitive damages) that could threaten the solvency of many insurers and negatively affect the continued availability and affordability of personal lines insurance. Even without more, but especially in light of these potentially devastating consequences, the Ninth Circuit's erroneous and unsupported interpretation of FCRA's notice requirements should not be allowed to stand.

D. The Ninth Circuit's Conclusions on Notice and Willfulness Are Inconsistent with FCRA's Intent and Threaten to Subject the Insurance Industry to Potentially Crippling Penalties.

Violations of FCRA, including the failure to comply with the adverse action notice requirements of section 1681m(a), subject the users of consumer reports to a variety of civil damages and penalties. "Negligent noncompliance" subjects a user to liability for actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the noncompliance, plus court costs and attorney fees in the event of successful litigation. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a). If the noncompliance is "willful," the user is additionally liable for statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 per consumer, and may be liable for punitive damages as well. *Id.* § 1681n(a).

As explained by petitioners, the Ninth Circuit's adoption of a "reckless disregard" standard of willfulness blurs the distinction between negligent and willful conduct and is therefore contrary to this Court's prior holdings.[8] Even were

---

8. *See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston*, 469 U.S. 111, 129-30 (1985), and *McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.*, 486 U.S. 128, 135 (1988), both of which hold that mere negligence does not equal willfulness.

that not so clearly the case, other circuits have concluded – correctly – that the level of culpability required to constitute "willfulness" under FCRA is much higher than mere recklessness, reserving its application to situations in which the defendant *knew* the challenged conduct to be unlawful. *See*, *e.g.*, *Phillips v. Grendahl*, 312 F.3d 357, 368, 370 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that "the statute's use of the word 'willfully' imports the requirement that the defendant *know* his or her conduct is unlawful" and that "willful noncompliance under section 1681n requires *knowing and intentional* commission of an act the defendant knows to violate the law" (emphasis added)); *Duncan v. Handmaker*, 149 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[I]n order to incur civil liability for operating under false pretenses, a party must act willfully and purposefully 'with a motivation to injure.' [Citation.] This interpretation comports with the language of § 1681n . . . ."). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit specifically acknowledged this authority but opted to follow the "reckless disregard" standard adopted by the Third Circuit in *Cushman v. Trans Union Corp.*, 115 F.3d 220, 229 (3d Cir. 1997).[9] *Reynolds*, 435 F.3d at 1098.

The Ninth Circuit's erroneous interpretation of the term "willfully" should be rejected. If the Ninth Circuit's "reckless disregard" standard were to be applied to all aspects of FCRA compliance, including the content of adverse action notices, major segments of the insurance industry could be subjected to potentially ruinous statutory and punitive damages resulting from the routine – and long-approved – use of consumer reports. The alternative is that insurers may be dissuaded from using consumer reports altogether, which would *increase* the cost of insurance to consumers.[10]

---

9. Although declining to adopt an "actual knowledge" standard, the *Cushman* court was at least careful to point out that, to be actionable as a "willful" violation, the defendant's conduct "must be on the same order as willful concealments or misrepresentations." *Cushman*, 115 F.3d at 227. The Ninth Circuit has not similarly qualified its holding.

10. *See* note 7 above.

These potential results are far removed from Congress's intent in enacting FCRA, which specifically authorizes the use of consumer reports in the underwriting of insurance. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. At the same time, the effect of the Ninth Circuit's notice requirements is to seriously disrupt the ability of insurers to do business and, in the final analysis, to harm the very consumers that FCRA was enacted to protect.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons discussed above and in the briefs submitted by petitioners, this Court should reverse the judgments below and remand for reinstatement of the judgments in favor of petitioners.

Respectfully submitted,

SUSAN M. POPIK
Counsel of Record
MERRI A. BALDWIN
CHAPMAN, POPIK & WHITE LLP
650 California Street, 19th Floor
San Francisco, California 94108
(415) 352-3000
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae