Subject:
Resources:
Thomas C. GoldsteinFor Respondent Jacoway:
Goldstein & Howe, P.C.
Washington, DC
Colli C. McKiever
Fayetteville, AR
Melvin T. Smith v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts
No. 03-8661
Subject:
Resources:
David J. NathansonFor Respondent Massachusetts:
Boston, MA
Cathryn A. Neaves
Massachusetts Attorney General's Office
Boston, MA
Monday, December 6
Reginald A. Wilkinson, Director, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, et al. v. William D. Dotson, et al.
No. 03-287
Subject:
- When a prisoner invokes 1983 to challenge parole proceedings, does Heck v. Humphrey's favorable termination requirement apply where success by the prisoner on the claim would result only in a new parole hearing and not necessarily guarantee earlier release from prison?
- Does a federal court judgment ordering a new parole hearing "necessarily imply the invalidity of" the decision at the previous parole hearing for purposes of Heck v. Humphrey?
Resources:
Douglas R. ColeFor Respondents Dotson, et al.:
State Solicitor General
Columbus, OH
Robert S. Walker
John Q. Lewis
Jones Day
Cleveland, OH
Thomas Joe Miller-El v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Dep't of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division
No. 03-9659
Subject:
Resources:
Jim MarcusFor Respondent Dretke:
Texas Defender Service
Houston, TX
Gena Blount Bunn
Assistant Attorney General
Austin, TX
Tuesday, December 7
Jennifer M. Granholm, Governor of Michigan, et al. v. Eleanor Heald, et al.
No. 03-1116
Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Eleanor Heald, et al.
No. 03-1120
Juanita Swedenburg, et al. v. Edward D. Kelly, Chairman, New York Div. of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, State Liquor Auth., et al.
No. 03-1274
Subject:
Does a State's regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of Sec. 2 of the 21st Amendment?Decisions:
Resources:
Thomas L. CaseyFor Respondents Heald, et al.:
Solicitor General
Michigan Attorney General's Office
Lansing, MI
James A. TanfordNo. 03-1120
Bloomington, IN
Anthony S. KogutFor Respondents Heald, et al.:
Willingham & Cote, P. C.
East Lansing, MI
James A. Tanford
Bloomington, IN
Clint BolickFor Respondents Kelly, et al.:
Washington, DC
Miguel A. EstradaFor Respondent State of New York:
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
Washington, DC
Caitlin Joan Halligan
Solicitor General
New York Attorney General's Office
New York, NY
Claude M. Ballard, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
No. 03-184
Estate of Kanter, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
No. 03-1034
Subject:
Ballard, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-184Decisions:
In this case, the trial was conducted by a Special Trial Judge employed at will by the Tax Court. The Special Trial Judge was required to create a report of factual and legal findings, but his original report has never been made available to the parties, the public, or the reviewing Article III courts. Instead, his superiors on the Tax Court either overruled his factual findings or persuaded him to change his mind, thus creating a factual finding of tax fraud. This entire process took place off the record, and came to light only in a subsequent conversation between two Tax Court judges and a counsel for another party.
The questions presented are:Estate of Kanter, et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, No. 03-1034
- Whether this secretive process is consistent with the Due Process Clause or the right to effective Article III review?
- Whether this secretive process is consistent with 26 U.S.C. 7482, which provides that Article III courts must review Tax Court decisions just as they would decisions of a U.S. district court?
The Tax Court keeps secret, even from the reviewing courts of appeals, the findings of fact and credibility judgments of its special trial judges. By law, these trial judges are required to file reports containing findings of fact and opinion with the Tax Court. Tax Ct. R. 183(b). By law, these findings of fact "shall be presumed to be correct" and the Tax Court is required to give "due regard" to the circumstance that the trial judge "had the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses." Tax Ct. R. 183(c). Nonetheless, the Tax Court overturns the factual findings, including the credibility findings, of its trial judges without the record revealing those findings or that the Tax Court has overturned them. Secret trial judge reports preclude the courts of appeals from determining whether the Tax Court has complied with the legal constraints described above. Secret trial judge reports also preclude the courts of appeals from reviewing a Tax Court decision on the basis of the entire record on which that decision in fact rests. Federal statutes require that "all reports of the Tax Court * * * shall be public records." 26 U.S.C. 7461(a).
The questions presented are:
- Whether the due process clause or the governing federal statutes require that the courts of appeals be able to review Tax Court decisions on the basis of the complete record, including the trial judge's findings of fact that, by law, the Tax Court must presume to be correct.
- Whether Tax Court Rule 183 requires judges of the Tax Court to uphold findings of fact and credibility judgments made by their trial judges unless those findings are "clearly erroneous," as the D.C. Circuit has held, or are those findings and credibility judgments entitled to no deference at all, as the Seventh Circuit held in this case.
Resources:
Vester T. Hughes, Jr.For Petitioners Estate of Kanter, et al.:
Hughes & Luce
Dallas, TX
Richard H. PildesFor Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue:
Cambridge, MA
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
Wednesday, December 8
Ann M. Veneman, Secretary of Agriculture, et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al.
No. 03-1164
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al.
No. 03-1165
Subject:
Veneman, et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al., No. 03-1164Decisions:
Whether the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 (Beef Act), 7 U.S.C. 2901 et seq., and the implementing Beef Promotion and Research Order (Beef Order), 7 C.F.R. Part 1260, violate the First Amendment insofar as they require cattle producers to pay assessments to fund generic advertising with which they disagree.
Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al. v. Livestock Marketing, et al., No. 03-1165
Whether the Eighth Circuit erred in holding that the Beef Promotion and Research Act of 1985 ("Beef Act"), 7 U.S.C. 2901 et seq., and regulations promulgated thereunder—which impose assessments on beef producers and importers to fund research, education, and promotional activities carried out by special administrative bodies created by Congress for the express purpose of furthering important governmental objectives under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of Agriculture—are "unconstitutional and unenforceable."
Resources:
Paul D. ClementFor Petitioners Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc., et al.
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
Lorane F. HebertFor Respondents Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, et al.:
Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P.
Washington, DC
Ronald A. Parsons, Jr.
Johnson, Heidepriem, Miner,
Marlow & Janklow, LLP
Sioux Falls, SD
Philip C. Olsson
Olsson Frank and Weeda
Washington, DC
Darin L. Muehler, et al. v. Iris Mena
No. 03-1423
Subject:
Resources:
Carter G. PhillipsFor Respondent Mena:
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP
Washington, DC
Paul L. Hoffman
Schonbrun DeSimone Seplow Harris Hoffman
Venice, CA
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