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Supreme Court Docket

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January 2005
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Monday, January 10

State of Alaska v. United States of America
No. 128, Orig.

Subject:

    Ownership of Marine Submerged Lands, Historic Inland Waters, Juridical Bays
Questions:
  1. The Court should decline to adopt the Special Masters recommendation that the United States be granted summary judgment on Count IV of the Amended Complaint. See Report at 227-276. Instead, the Court should grant summary judgment to Alaska on Count IV because, inter alia, the plain language of Section 6(e) of the Alaska Statehood Act does not express the requisite unambiguous intent of Congress to reserve for the United States submerged lands within the boundaries of the Glacier Bay National Monument, but rather expressly applies only to a narrow subset of other lands that are indisputably not at issue here.

  2. The Court should decline to adopt the Special Masters recommendation that the United States be granted summary judgment on Count I of the Amended Complaint. See Report at 9-137. Instead, the Court should grant summary judgment to Alaska on Count I because the undisputed historical record demonstrates that the United States continuously exercised sovereignty over the waters of the Alexander Archipelago with the acquiescence of foreign nations, and the Nation's vital interests support a finding of historic waters status.

  3. The Court should decline to adopt the Special Masters recommendation that the United States be granted summary judgment on Count II of the Amended Complaint. See Report at 138-226. Instead, the Court should grant summary judgment to Alaska on Count II as to the areas referred to as North Bay and South Bay because the undisputed record demonstrates that the areas qualify as juridical bays under Article 7 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and the assimilation principles adopted and applied by this Court in United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504 (1986).
Decisions:

Resources:

Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Plaintiff State of Alaska:

Joanne Grace
Assistant Attorney General
Anchorage, AK
For Defendant United States:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC


Dennis Bates, et al. v. Dow Agrosciences LLC
No. 03-388

Subject:

Question: Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioners Dennis Bates, et al.:

David C. Frederick
Kellogg, Huber, Hansen,
  Todd, Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C.
Washington, DC
For Respondent Dow Agrosciences LLC:
Dean T. Barnhard
Barnes & Thornburg
Indianapolis, IN


Tuesday, January 11

City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, et al.
No. 03-855

Subject:

Questions:
  1. Whether alleged reservation land is Indian Country pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1151 and this Court's decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998) ("Venetie") where the land was neither set aside by the federal government nor superintended by the federal government?

  2. Whether alleged reservation land was set aside by the federal government for purposes of Indian Country analysis under 18 U.S.C. 1151 and Venetie where the alleged reservation was established by the State of New York in the 1788 Treaty of Fort Schuyler, and not by any federal treaty, action or enactment?

  3. Whether the 1838 Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which required the New York Oneidas to permanently abandon their lands in New York, resulted in the disestablishment of the Oneida's alleged New York reservation?

  4. Whether alleged reservation land may (i) remain Indian Country or (ii) be subject to the protections of the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, if the tribe claiming reservation status and Non-Intercourse Act protection ceases to exist?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Sherrill, NY:

Ira S. Sacks
Gursky & Partners, LLP
New York, NY
For Respondents Oneida Indian Nation
     of New York, et al.:
Michael R. Smith
Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP
Washington, DC


George J. Tenet, Individually and as Director of Central Intelligence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, et al., v. John Doe, et ux.
No. 03-1395

Subject:

    Lifetime Financial Assistance, Central Intelligence Agency
Question:
    Whether Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875), bars a district court from considering respondents' due process and tort claims that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has wrongfully refused to keep its alleged promise to provide them with life-time financial assistance in exchange for their alleged espionage services to the CIA.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioners Tenet, et al.:

Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
For Respondents Doe, et ux.:
Steven W. Hale
Perkins Coie
Seattle, WA


Wednesday, January 12

Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. v. Michael Broudo, et al.
No. 03-932

Subject:

    Securities Fraud
Question:
    Whether a securities fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-market theory must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and proving a causal connection between the alleged fraud and the investment's subsequent decline in price.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc.:

William F. Sullivan
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP
San Diego, CA
For Respondents Broudo, et al.:
Eric A. Isaacson
Lerach Coughlin Stoia & Robbins LLP
San Diego, CA


Charles Russell Rhines v. Douglas Weber, Warden
No. 03-9046

Subject:

Questions:
  1. Can a federal court stay (rather than being compelled to dismiss) a 2254 habeas corpus petition which includes exhausted and unexhausted claims, when the stay is necessary to permit a petitioner to exhaust claims in state court without having the one year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) bar the right to a federal petition?

  2. Is the Eighth Circuit correct that dismissal of a mixed 2254 petition is mandated by Rose v. Lundy, or are the courts of appeals for the first, second, sixth, seventh and ninth circuits correct in following the separate concurrences of Justice Souter and Justice Stevens in Duncan v. Walker that a stay of an otherwise timely filed federal petition is permissible in light of the [sic] AEDPA?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Rhines:

Roberto A. Lange
Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, LLP
Sioux Falls, SD
For Respondent Weber:
Craig M. Eichstadt
South Dakata Attorney General's Office
Pierre, SD


Tuesday, January 18

Ronald Rompilla v. Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
No. 04-5462

Subject:

    Death Penalty, Life-Without-Parole Instruction, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, Habeas Corpus, Criminal Law
Questions:
    Questions related to the Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), issue:
  1. Does Simmons require a life-without-parole instruction where: the only alternative to a death sentence under state law is life without possibility of parole; the jury asks the court three questions about parole and rehabilitation during eleven hours of penalty-phase deliberations; the prosecution's evidence is that the defendant is a violent recidivist who functions poorly outside prison and who killed someone three months after being paroled from a lengthy prison term; and the prosecutor argues that the defendant is a frightening repeat offender and cold-blooded killer who learned from prior convictions that he should kill anyone who might identify him?

  2. Is the state court decision denying the Simmons claim "contrary to" and/or an "unreasonable application" of clearly established Supreme Court law where the state court held that, a history of violent convictions is irrelevant to the jury's assessment of future dangerousness, while ignoring the jury's questions about parole eligibility and rehabilitation and the prosecution's actual evidence and argument?
    3. Questions related to counsel's ineffective assistance at capital sentencing:
  3. Has a defendant received effective representation at capital sentencing where counsel does not review prior conviction records counsel knows the prosecution will use in aggravation, and where those records would have provided mitigating evidence regarding the defendant's traumatic childhood and mental health impairments?

  4. Has a defendant received effective representation at capital sentencing where counsel's background mitigation investigation is limited to conversations with a few family members; where the few people with whom counsel spoke indicated to counsel that they did not know much about the defendant and could not help with background mitigation; where other sources of background information, including other family members, prior conviction records, prison records, juvenile court records and school records, were available but ignored by counsel; and where the records and other family members would have provided compelling mitigating evidence about the defendant's traumatic childhood, mental retardation and psychological disturbances?

  5. Does counsel's ineffectiveness warrant habeas relief under AEDPA where the state court sought to excuse counsel's failure to obtain any records about the defendant's history by saying the records contained some information that was "not entirely helpful," by saying counsel hired mental health experts (even though those experts did not do any background investigation and never saw the records), and by saying counsel spoke to some family members (even though those family members told counsel they knew little about the defendant and could not help with mitigation); and where the state court did not even try to address counsel's failure to interview other family members (who knew the defendant's mitigating history) or counsel's complete failure to investigate the aggravation that the prosecution told counsel it would use?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Rompilla:

Billy H. Nolas
Defender Association of Philadelphia
Philadelphia, PA
For Respondent Beard:
Amy Zapp
Pennsylvania Attorney General's Office
Harrisburg, PA


Robert Johnson v. United States
No. 03-9685

Subject:

    Federal Sentence Enhancements, Habeas Corpus
Question:
    When a federal court bases an enhanced sentence on a vacated state conviction, is the vacatur of the state conviction a "fact" supporting a prisoner's 28 U.S.C. 2255 claim requiring reduction of the prisoner's sentence?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Johnson:

Courtland L. Reichman
King & Spalding, LLP
Atlanta, GA
For Respondent United States:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC


Wednesday, January 19

City of Rancho Palos Verdes, California, et al. v. Mark J. Abrams
No. 03-1601

Subject:

Question:
    Whether, as held below but contrary to decisions of the Third and Seventh Circuits, the limits on state and local zoning and land-use authority established by Section 332(c)(7)(B) of the Communications Act may be enforced through an action for damages and attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioners Rancho Palos Verdes, et al.:

Jeffrey A. Lamken
Baker Botts L.L.P.
Washington, DC
For Respondent Abrams:
David Finley Williams
Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft
Washington, DC


Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board, et al. v. Andrea L. Beaver, et al.
No. 04-37

Subject:

    Election Law, Semi-Closed Primaries, Right of Association
Questions:
  1. Whether Oklahoma's semi-closed primary election law - which allows a political party to invite non-affiliated voters but not voters registered with another political party to vote in its partisan primary but prevents a voter registered with another political party from voting in that primary - violates the First Amendment rights of a political party and its members to associate.

  2. Whether the decision in California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) requires that a State allow a political party, at its option, to open its political party primary election to any registered voter regardless of that registered voter's political affiliation.

  3. Whether the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in finding that the State of Oklahoma's restrictions constituted a severe burden on the right of association of the political party thereby requiring the regulation to be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest or whether the appropriate standard is the balancing test which has been applied in election cases before this Court.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioners Clingman, et al.:

Wellon B. Poe, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Oklahoma City, OK
For Respondents Beaver, et al.:
James C. Linger
Tulsa, OK


 

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