Supreme Court Docket
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October 2004
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Monday, October 4
State of Kansas v. State of Colorado
No. 105, Orig.
Subject:
Questions:
- Whether the Court should appoint a "river master" to resolve
computer modeling issues that may arise after entry of a contemplated decree
in this case. (Kansas Exception 1).
- Whether Kansas is entitled to prejudgment interest, accruing from
1985 forward, for damages resulting from Compact violations from 1950 to
1985. (Kansas Exception 2).
Decisions and Reports:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
Special Master:
Arthur L. Littleworth
Best, Best & Krieger
Riverside, CA
For Plaintiff State of Kansas:
John B. Draper
Montgomery & Andrews
Santa Fe, NM
For Defendant State of Colorado
David Robbins
Hill & Robbins
Denver, CO
For Respondent United States:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al. v. John C. Tesmer, et al.
No. 03-407
Subject:
Guilty Plea, Right to Appellate Counsel, Fourteenth Amendment, Third-Party Standing, Criminal Law
Questions:
The Michigan Constitution, Mich Const 1963, art I, 20, provides that a
criminal defendant who pleads guilty shall not have an appeal of right and
shall have a right to appointed appellate counsel "as provided by law." A
Michigan statute, Michigan Compiled Law (MCL) 770.3a, provides, with
significant listed exceptions, that criminal defendants who plead guilty shall
not have appointed appellate counsel for discretionary appeals for review of
the defendant's conviction or sentence.
- Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a right to an appointed
appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal of an indigent criminal
defendant convicted by a guilty plea?
- Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential future
indigent criminal defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state
statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first
appeals following convictions by guilty pleas where the federal courts
properly abstained from hearing the claims of indigent criminal defendants
themselves?
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioners Kowalski, et al.:
Thomas L. Casey
State Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
Lansing, MI
For Respondents Tesmer, et al.:
Mark Granzotto
Royal Oak, MI
For Respondent Kolenda:
Judy E. Bregman
Bregman & Welch
Grand Haven, MI
United States v. Freddie J. Booker
No. 04-104
United States v. Ducan Fanfan
No. 04-105
Subject:
Sixth Amendment, Sentence Enhancements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Right to Jury Trial
Questions:
- Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior
conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.
- If the answer to the first question is "yes," the following question is presented: whether, in
a case in which the Guidelines would require the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Sentencing
Guidelines as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis, such that the
sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence the defendant within the maximum and minimum
set by statute for the offense of conviction.
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner United States:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
For Respondent Booker:
T. Christopher Kelly
Kelly & Habermehl,
P.C.
Madison, WI
For Respondent Fanfan:
Seth P. Waxman
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP
Washington, DC
Tuesday, October 5
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions, Inc., et al.
No. 03-409
Subject:
Trademark Infringement, Fair Use, Intellectual Property
Question:
Does the classic fair use defense to trademark infringement require the party
asserting the defense to demonstrate an absence of likelihood of confusion,
as is the rule in the 9th Circuit, or is Fair Use an absolute defense,
irrespective of whether or not confusion may result, as is the rule in other
Circuits?
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.:
Michael Machat
Beverly Hills, CA
For Respondents Lasting Impression, Inc., et al.:
Charles C.H. Wu
Wu & Cheung, LLP
Irvine, CA
Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Bradley Nigh
No. 03-377
Subject:
Question:
Whether the $1,000 statutory limit originally adopted in 1968 as a cap on
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) recoveries under 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(2)(A)(i)
has been rendered inapplicable to that subpart by subsequent amendments
to Section 1640(a)(2)(A) -- though there is no evidence of any Congressional
intent to effect such a change -- so that parties who suffer no actual
damages may now recover far in excess of the previous $1,000 cap.
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.:
Donald B. Ayer
Jones Day
Washington, DC
For Respondent Nigh:
A. Hugo
Blankingship
Blankingship &
Associates, P.C.
Washington, DC
Wednesday, October 6
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., et al.
No. 02-1028
Subject:
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"), Contracts
Questions:
- Whether a cargo owner that contracts with a freight forwarder for
transportation of goods to a destination in the United States is bound by the
contracts that the freight forwarder makes with carriers to provide that
transportation.
- Whether federal maritime law requires that terms of a bill of lading
extending liability limitations under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C. app. 1300-1315, to "independent contractors"
used to perform the contract of transportation must be narrowly construed
to cover only those independent contractors in privity of contract with the
bill's issuer .
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Norfolk Southern Railway Co.:
Carter G.
Phillips
Sidley Austin Brown &
Wood LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondents James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd, et al.:
Michael F.
Sturley
Austin, TX
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
No. 02-1192
Subject:
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Contribution, Clean-Up
Costs, Environmental Law
Question:
Whether a private party who has not been the subject of an underlying civil
action pursuant to CERCLA Sections 106 or 107, 42 U.S.C. 9606
or 9607,
may bring an action seeking contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section
113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1), to recover costs spent voluntarily to clean
up properties contaminated by hazardous substances.
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Cooper Industries, Inc.:
William Bradford
Reynolds
Howrey Simon Arnold &
White, LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondent Aviall Services, Inc.:
Richard O. Faulk
Gardere Wynne Sewell
LLP
Houston, TX
Tuesday, October 12
Josue Leocal v. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., et al.
No. 03-583
Subject:
Question:
The court below interpreted
18
U.S.C. 16 to include DUI with serious bodily injury as a "crime
of violence"--and therefore an "aggravated felony" as defined under
101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")--where
the statute under which Petitioner was convicted required nothing more
than negligence for conviction. That ruling conflicts with decisions of
other United States Courts of Appeals and with the interpretation of the
Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA " or "Board").
The question presented is as follows:
Whether, in the
absence of a mens rea of at least recklessness with respect to the active
application of force against another, DUI with serious bodily injury
is a "crime of violence" under 18
U.S.C. 16 that constitutes an "aggravated felony" under
101 of the INA?
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Leocal:
J. Sedwick Sollers III
King & Spalding
LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondents Ashcroft, et al.:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
Keyse G. Jama v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
No. 03-674
Subject:
Removal of Aliens, Acceptance by Foreign Country, Deportation
Question:
Whether the Attorney General can remove an alien to one of the countries
designated in 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E) without obtaining that country's
acceptance of the alien prior to removal.
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Jama:
Jeffrey J.
Keyes
Briggs and Morgan,
P.A.
Minneapolis, MN
For Respondent INS:
Paul D.
Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
Wednesday, October 13
Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center v. Christopher Simmons
No. 03-633
Subject:
Minimum Age for Capital Punishment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment
Questions:
The Supreme Court of Missouri departed from this Court's holding in Stanford
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), in which the Court upheld statutes under
which the minimum age for capital punishment is sixteen. The Missouri
court's decision raises two questions:
- Once this Court holds that a particular punishment is not "cruel and
unusual" and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, can a
lower court reach a contrary decision based on its own analysis of evolving
standards?
- Is the imposition of the death penalty on a person who commits a murder
at age seventeen "cruel and unusual," and thus barred by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments?
Decisions:
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Roper:
Stephen D.
Hawke
Assistant Attorney General
Jefferson City, MO
For Respondent Simmons:
Jennifer
Herndon
St. Louis, MO
A. Neil Clark, Field Office Director, Seattle, Washington, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, et al. v. Sergio S. Martinez
No. 03-878
Daniel Benitez v. Michael Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami, Florida, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement
No. 03-7434
Subject:
Detention of Permanent Resident Aliens, Removal, Deportation, Immigration Law
Question:
Whether [8 U.S.C.] Section 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001)
compel the release of an arriving alien who was
apprehended at the border of the United States, denied
admission, and ordered removed from the United
States.
Decisions:
- U.S. Court of Appeals
- 11th Circuit
(Benitez v.
Wallis), Opinion Filed: July 17, 2003
- U.S. Court of Appeals - 9th Circuit, (Martinez v. Smith), Unpublished Order Filed: August
18, 2003
- United States Supreme
Court, Case No. 03-878, Cert. Granted: March 1, 2004
- United States Supreme
Court, Case No. 03-3474, Cert. Granted: January 16, 2004
Resources:
Briefs:
Parties
Amicus - Supporting Petitioner Benitez (No. 03-7434)
Counsel of Record
For Petitioners Clark,
et al.
and Respondent Rozos:
Paul D.
Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
For Respondent Martinez:
Christine
Stebbins Dahl
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Portland, OR
For Petitioner Benitez:
John
Stewart Mills
Mills &
Carlin
Jacksonville, FL
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