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US Supreme Court Docket

Supreme Court Docket

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October 2004
[Download October 2004 Argument Calendar PDF]
[Click here for 2003 Docket]
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Monday, October 4
State of Kansas v. State of Colorado
No. 105, Orig.

Subject:

Questions:
  1. Whether the Court should appoint a "river master" to resolve computer modeling issues that may arise after entry of a contemplated decree in this case. (Kansas Exception 1).

  2. Whether Kansas is entitled to prejudgment interest, accruing from 1985 forward, for damages resulting from Compact violations from 1950 to 1985. (Kansas Exception 2).
Decisions and Reports:

Resources:

Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

Special Master:

Arthur L. Littleworth
Best, Best & Krieger
Riverside, CA
For Plaintiff State of Kansas:
John B. Draper
Montgomery & Andrews
Santa Fe, NM
For Defendant State of Colorado
David Robbins
Hill & Robbins
Denver, CO
For Respondent United States:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC


John F. Kowalski, Judge, 26th Judicial Circuit Court of Michigan, et al. v. John C. Tesmer, et al.
No. 03-407

Subject:

    Guilty Plea, Right to Appellate Counsel, Fourteenth Amendment, Third-Party Standing, Criminal Law
Questions:
    The Michigan Constitution, Mich Const 1963, art I, 20, provides that a criminal defendant who pleads guilty shall not have an appeal of right and shall have a right to appointed appellate counsel "as provided by law." A Michigan statute, Michigan Compiled Law (MCL) 770.3a, provides, with significant listed exceptions, that criminal defendants who plead guilty shall not have appointed appellate counsel for discretionary appeals for review of the defendant's conviction or sentence.
  1. Does the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee a right to an appointed appellate attorney in a discretionary first appeal of an indigent criminal defendant convicted by a guilty plea?

  2. Do attorneys have third-party standing on behalf of potential future indigent criminal defendants to make a constitutional challenge to a state statute prohibiting appointment of appellate counsel in discretionary first appeals following convictions by guilty pleas where the federal courts properly abstained from hearing the claims of indigent criminal defendants themselves?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioners Kowalski, et al.:

Thomas L. Casey
State Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
Lansing, MI
For Respondents Tesmer, et al.:
Mark Granzotto
Royal Oak, MI
For Respondent Kolenda:
Judy E. Bregman
Bregman & Welch
Grand Haven, MI


United States v. Freddie J. Booker
No. 04-104

United States v. Ducan Fanfan
No. 04-105

Subject:

    Sixth Amendment, Sentence Enhancements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, Right to Jury Trial
Questions:
  1. Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.

  2. If the answer to the first question is "yes," the following question is presented: whether, in a case in which the Guidelines would require the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Sentencing Guidelines as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis, such that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence the defendant within the maximum and minimum set by statute for the offense of conviction.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner United States:

Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
For Respondent Booker:
T. Christopher Kelly
Kelly & Habermehl, P.C.
Madison, WI
For Respondent Fanfan:
Seth P. Waxman
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP
Washington, DC


Tuesday, October 5

KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions, Inc., et al.
No. 03-409

Subject:

    Trademark Infringement, Fair Use, Intellectual Property
Question:
    Does the classic fair use defense to trademark infringement require the party asserting the defense to demonstrate an absence of likelihood of confusion, as is the rule in the 9th Circuit, or is Fair Use an absolute defense, irrespective of whether or not confusion may result, as is the rule in other Circuits?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:
    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc.:

Michael Machat
Beverly Hills, CA
For Respondents Lasting Impression, Inc., et al.:
Charles C.H. Wu
Wu & Cheung, LLP
Irvine, CA


Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Bradley Nigh
No. 03-377

Subject:

Question:
    Whether the $1,000 statutory limit originally adopted in 1968 as a cap on Truth in Lending Act (TILA) recoveries under 15 U.S.C. 1640(a)(2)(A)(i) has been rendered inapplicable to that subpart by subsequent amendments to Section 1640(a)(2)(A) -- though there is no evidence of any Congressional intent to effect such a change -- so that parties who suffer no actual damages may now recover far in excess of the previous $1,000 cap.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties     Amicus - Supporting Petitioner Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.:

Donald B. Ayer
Jones Day
Washington, DC
For Respondent Nigh:
A. Hugo Blankingship
Blankingship & Associates, P.C.
Washington, DC


Wednesday, October 6

Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., et al.
No. 02-1028

Subject:

    Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"), Contracts
Questions:
  1. Whether a cargo owner that contracts with a freight forwarder for transportation of goods to a destination in the United States is bound by the contracts that the freight forwarder makes with carriers to provide that transportation.

  2. Whether federal maritime law requires that terms of a bill of lading extending liability limitations under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ("COGSA"), 46 U.S.C. app. 1300-1315, to "independent contractors" used to perform the contract of transportation must be narrowly construed to cover only those independent contractors in privity of contract with the bill's issuer .
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties     Amicus - Supporting Petitioner Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Norfolk Southern Railway Co.:

Carter G. Phillips
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondents James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd, et al.:
Michael F. Sturley
Austin, TX


Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.
No. 02-1192

Subject:

    Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Contribution, Clean-Up Costs, Environmental Law
Question:
    Whether a private party who has not been the subject of an underlying civil action pursuant to CERCLA Sections 106 or 107, 42 U.S.C. 9606 or 9607, may bring an action seeking contribution pursuant to CERCLA Section 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(1), to recover costs spent voluntarily to clean up properties contaminated by hazardous substances.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties     Amicus - Supporting Petitioner Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Cooper Industries, Inc.:

William Bradford Reynolds
Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondent Aviall Services, Inc.:
Richard O. Faulk
Gardere Wynne Sewell LLP
Houston, TX


Tuesday, October 12

Josue Leocal v. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., et al.
No. 03-583

Subject:

Question:
    The court below interpreted 18 U.S.C. 16 to include DUI with serious bodily injury as a "crime of violence"--and therefore an "aggravated felony" as defined under 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")--where the statute under which Petitioner was convicted required nothing more than negligence for conviction. That ruling conflicts with decisions of other United States Courts of Appeals and with the interpretation of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA " or "Board").

    The question presented is as follows:
    Whether, in the absence of a mens rea of at least recklessness with respect to the active application of force against another, DUI with serious bodily injury is a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. 16 that constitutes an "aggravated felony" under 101 of the INA?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Leocal:

J. Sedwick Sollers III
King & Spalding LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondents Ashcroft, et al.:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC


Keyse G. Jama v. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
No. 03-674

Subject:

    Removal of Aliens, Acceptance by Foreign Country, Deportation
Question:
    Whether the Attorney General can remove an alien to one of the countries designated in 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(2)(E) without obtaining that country's acceptance of the alien prior to removal.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties
Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Jama:

Jeffrey J. Keyes
Briggs and Morgan, P.A.
Minneapolis, MN
For Respondent INS:
Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC


Wednesday, October 13

Donald P. Roper, Superintendent, Potosi Correctional Center v. Christopher Simmons
No. 03-633

Subject:

    Minimum Age for Capital Punishment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment
Questions:
    The Supreme Court of Missouri departed from this Court's holding in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), in which the Court upheld statutes under which the minimum age for capital punishment is sixteen. The Missouri court's decision raises two questions:
  1. Once this Court holds that a particular punishment is not "cruel and unusual" and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, can a lower court reach a contrary decision based on its own analysis of evolving standards?

  2. Is the imposition of the death penalty on a person who commits a murder at age seventeen "cruel and unusual," and thus barred by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties
Counsel of Record

For Petitioner Roper:

Stephen D. Hawke
Assistant Attorney General
Jefferson City, MO
For Respondent Simmons:
Jennifer Herndon
St. Louis, MO


A. Neil Clark, Field Office Director, Seattle, Washington, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al. v. Sergio S. Martinez
No. 03-878

Daniel Benitez v. Michael Rozos, Field Office Director, Miami, Florida, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
No. 03-7434

Subject:

    Detention of Permanent Resident Aliens, Removal, Deportation, Immigration Law
Question:
    Whether [8 U.S.C.] Section 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) compel the release of an arriving alien who was apprehended at the border of the United States, denied admission, and ordered removed from the United States.
Decisions:

Resources:


Briefs:

    Parties
    Amicus - Supporting Petitioner Benitez (No. 03-7434) Counsel of Record

For Petitioners Clark, et al.
    and Respondent Rozos:

Paul D. Clement
Acting U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
For Respondent Martinez:
Christine Stebbins Dahl
Assistant Federal Public Defender
Portland, OR
For Petitioner Benitez:
John Stewart Mills
Mills & Carlin
Jacksonville, FL



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