Supreme Court Docket
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January 2006
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Monday, January 8
Douglas B. Moylan, Attorney General of Guam v. Felix P. Camacho, Governor of Guam
No. 06-116
Subject:
Guam Organic Act, Aggregate Tax Valuation, Assessments, Tolling, Certiorari, Civil Procedure, Tax Law
Question:
- Whether the Supreme Court of Guam erred in interpreting the phrase aggregate
tax valuation in the Guam Organic Acts debt-limitation provision, 48 U.S.C.
1423a (emphasis added), as tying the limit on borrowing by the Guam territorial
government to the full value of property on Guam rather than to the assessed value
used for purposes of taxation.
- Whether the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari from this Court was tolled while a
petition for writ of certiorari or writ of certiorari with respect to the same judgment was pending
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket Sheet From the U.S.
Supreme Court.
- Northwestern
University - Medill School of Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Moylan, Attorney General of Guam:
Seth P. Waxman
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr,
LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondent Felix P. Camacho, Governor of Guam:
Arthur B. Clark
Tamuning, GU
United Haulers Association, Inc., et al. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, et
al.
No. 05-1345
Subject:
Commerce Clause, Interstate Commerce, Solid Waste, Flow-Control Ordinance, Preferred Processing Facility
Question:
The Court held in C
& A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 386
(1994), that a so-called flow control ordinance, which require[d] all solid waste to
be processed at a designated transfer station before leaving the municipality,
discriminated against interstate commerce and was invalid under the Commerce
Clause because it depriv[ed] competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access to
a local market. This case presents two questions, the first of which is the subject of
an acknowledged circuit conflict:
- Whether the virtually per se prohibition against hoard[ing] solid waste (Id. at
392) recognized in Carbone is inapplicable when the preferred processing
facility (ibid.) is owned by a public entity
- Whether a flow-control ordinance that requires delivery of all solid waste to a
publicly owned local facility and thus prohibits its exportation imposes so
insubstantial a burden on interstate commerce that the provision satisfies the
Commerce Clause if it serves even a minimal local benefit.
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket Sheet From the
U.S. Supreme Court.
- Northwestern
University - Medill School of Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioners United Haulers Association, Inc., et al..:
Evan Mark Tager
Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw LLP
Washington, DC
For Respondents Oneida-Herkimer etc., et al.:
Michael J. Cahill
Germano & Cahill, P.C.
Holbrook, NY
Tuesday, January 9
Sinochem International Co., Ltd. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corporation
No. 06-102
Subject:
Jurisdiction, Personal Jurisdiction, Forum Non Conveniens, Civil Procedure
Questions:
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a district court
must first conclusively determine if it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant
before it may dismiss the suit on the ground of forum non conveniens. The court
acknowledged that its holding was inconsistent with the interests of judicial
economy, recognized that its decision in the case deepened an-already existing 2-4
split among the circuits, and invited this Courts review.
The question presented is:
Whether a district court must first conclusively establish jurisdiction before
dismissing a suit on the ground of forum non conveniens?
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket Sheet - No.
06-102 From the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Northwestern
University - Medill School of Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Sinochem Int'l:
Gregory A. Castanias
Jones Day
Washington, DC
For Petitioner Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp.:
Kevin L. McGee
Rawle & Henderson LLP
Philadelphia, PA
Dora B. Schriro, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections v. Jeffrey Timothy
Landrigan, aka Billy Patrick Wayne Hill
No. 05-1575
Subject:
Capital Cases, Capital Sentencing, Mitigation, Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Question:
Respondent Jeffrey Landrigan actively thwarted his attorneys efforts to develop
and present mitigation evidence in his capital sentencing proceeding. Landrigan told
the trial judge that he did not want his attorney to present any mitigation evidence,
including proposed testimony from witnesses whom his attorney had subpoenaed to
testify. On post-conviction review, the state court rejected as frivolous an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim in which Landrigan asserted that if counsel had raised
the issue of Landrigans alleged genetic predisposition to violence, he would have
cooperated in presenting that type of mitigating evidence.
- In light of the highly deferential standard of review required in this case pursuant
to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), did the
Ninth Circuit err by holding that the state court unreasonably determined the facts
when it found that Landrigan instructed his attorney not to present any mitigating
evidence at the sentencing hearing?
- Did the Ninth Circuit err by finding that the state courts analysis of Landrigans
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was objectively unreasonable under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), notwithstanding the absence of any
contrary authority from this Court in cases in which (a) the defendant waives
presentation of mitigation and impedes counsels attempts to do so, or (b) the
evidence the defendant subsequently claims should have been presented is not
mitigating?
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket
Sheet From the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Northwestern
University - Medill School of Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Dora B. Schriro:
Kent E. Cattani
Office of the Attorney
General
Capital Litigation Section
Phoenix, AZ
For Respondent Landrigan:
Dale A. Baich
Office of the Federal Public Defender
Capital Habeas Unit
Phoenix, AZ
Wednesday, January 10
Zuni Public School District No. 89, et al. v. Department of Education, et
al.
No. 05-1508
Subject:
Federal Impact Aid Program, Federally Impacted Districts, School Districts, Indian
Reservations, Federal Lands, Equalization
Questions:
The Federal Impact Aid Program, 20 U.S.C. 7709, was enacted to subsidize local
State school districts which have a federal presence within the district such as
military bases or, as in the present case, Indian Reservations. These local
districts
are not able to tax such federally impacted lands. The Impact Aid Program
prohibits
the State from counting these federal subsidies as part of an impacted districts
budget when the State allocates operational funds to the local districts, unless
the
States operational funding to districts throughout the State is equalized under
an
equalization formula under the Impact Aid Program. If the States operational
funding is determined to be equalized, the State can reduce operational funding
to
an impacted district by the amount of the Impact Aid subsidy.
In 1994, the equalization formula was statutorily created and effectively
repealed
the equalization formula previously created by the Secretary of the United
States
Department of Education by regulation. However, in 1996, the Secretary, by
regulation, reinstated his repealed and conflicting equalization formula and
refuses
to follow Congress equalization formula. Under Congress formula, New Mexico is
not equalized and the intended beneficiaries receive the Impact Aid. Under the
Secretarys formula, New Mexico is deemed equalized and the Impact Aid is taken
from the impacted districts. The impacted districts are losing approximately
$50,000,000 per year in Impact Aid. The Tenth Circuit was split 6 to 6 on the
question, leaving the Secretarys formula in effect.
The question presented is:
- Whether the Secretary has the authority to create and impose his formula over
the one prescribed by Congress and through this process certify New Mexicos
operational funding for fiscal year 1999- 2000 as equalized, thereby diverting
the
Impact Aid subsidies to the State and whether this is one of the rare cases
where
this Court should exercise its supervisory jurisdiction to correct a plain error
that
affects all State school districts that educate federally connected children.
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket
Sheet From the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Northwestern University - Medill School of Journalism: On the
Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Zuni Public School District:
Ronald J. VanAmberg
Santa Fe, NM
For Respondent New Mexico Pub. Educ. Dep't:
Leigh Marc
Manasevit
Brustein &
Manasevit
Washington, DC
For Respondent Dep't of Educ. :
Paul D.
Clement
U.S. Solicitor General
Washington, DC
Gary Davenport, et al. v. Washington Education Association
No. 05-1589
Washington v. Washington Education Association
No. 05-1657
Subject:
Unions, First Amendment, Wages, Campaign Finance Laws, Nonmember Wage Seizure,
Labor Law
Questions:
- Do labor union officials have a First Amendment right to seize and use for
politics
the wages of employees who have chosen not to become union members?
- Does a state campaign finance law that prohibits labor unions and their
officials
from seizing and using the wages of nonmembers for partisan political
campaigns
without obtaining the nonmembers affirmative consent violate the First
Amendment
rights of labor unions?
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket
Sheet From the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Northwestern University - Medill School of Journalism: On
the Docket
Briefs:
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Davenport:
Milton L. Chappell
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc.
Springfield, VA
For Respondent Washington Educ. Ass'n:
John M.
West
Bredhoff
& Kaiser, P.L.L.C.
Washington, DC
Tuesday, January 16
Safeco Insurance Company of America, et al. v. Charles Burr, et
al.
No. 06-84
GEICO General Insurance Company, et al. v. Ajene Edo
No. 06-100
Subject:
Fair Credit Reporting Act, Willful Violation, Mens Rea, Consumer Credit,
Adverse Action
Questions:
In 06-100:
The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA or the Act) requires a user of
consumer
credit information to notify a consumer when the consumer has been
treated
adversely on the basis of his or her credit information. To enforce this
requirement,
Congress provided two tiers of civil remedies. Under 1681o of the Act,
if a
consumer shows that a users failure to send an adverse-action notice was
negligent, the consumer is entitled to recover actual damages. But under
1681n of
the Act, if the consumer makes a higher showing and proves that the
users failure
to send an adverse-action notice was willful, the consumer is entitled
to recover
statutory damages between $100 and $1,000 (in lieu of actual damages)
and
punitive damages.
A conflict exists between the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits, and
the Third and (now) Ninth Circuits over the mens rea required for a
willful violation
of FCRA. Separating itself from any other circuit to have decided the
issue and
compounding the circuit split, the Ninth Circuit held that a company may
be deemed
to have acted recklesslyand thereby willfully under the Actif the
company relied,
even in good faith, upon an interpretation of the Act that a court later
determines to
be unreasonable [], implausible, creative, or untenable, even if that
interpretation was derived from a legal opinion that the company sought
for the very
purpose of ensuring compliance with the law.
Two questions are presented:
- Whether the Ninth Circuits construction of willfully under 1681n of
FCRA
impermissibly permits a finding of willfulness to be based upon
nothing more than
negligence, gross negligence, or a completely good-faith but
incorrect interpretation
of the law, and upon conduct that is objectively reasonable as a
matter of law,
rather than requiring proof of a defendants knowledge that its
conduct violated
FCRA or, at a minimum, recklessness in its subjective form?
- Whether the Ninth Circuit improperly expanded 1681m of FCRA by
holding that
an adverse action has occurred and notice is required thereunder,
even when a
consumers credit information has had either no impact or a favorable
impact on the
rates and terms of the insurance that would otherwise have been
offered or
provided?
In 06-84:
Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that a defendant can be found
liable for a
willful violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) upon a finding
of
reckless disregard for FCRAs requirements, in conflict with the
unanimous
holdings of other circuits that willfulness requires actual knowledge
that the
defendants conduct violates FCRA.
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket Sheet From the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Northwestern University - Medill School of
Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Counsel of Record
For Petitioners Safeco, et al.:
Michael K.
Kellogg
Kellogg, Huber,
Hansen, Todd,
Evans & Figel, P.L.L.C.
Washington, DC
For Respondents Burr, et al.:
Scott A.
Shorr
Stoll Stoll Berne
Lokting & Schlachter PC
Portland, OR
Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America v. Pacific Gas
and Electric Company
No. 05-1429
Subject:
Attorney's Fees, Contracts, Bankruptcy Law
Question:
Petitioner and Respondent entered into a contract that included a
provision that
Petitioner is entitled to recover its attorneys fees incurred in
connection with the
enforcement, protection, or litigation of its contractual and legal
rights. Petitioner
incurred attorneys fees litigating its rights during the course of
Respondents
bankruptcy case and sought to recover them from Respondent. Adhering
to its prior
decision in Fobian v. Western Farm Credit Bank (In re Fobian), 951
F.2d 1149 (9th
Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit held that Petitioner could not recover
its attorneys fees
because the relevant litigation in the bankruptcy court involved
issues of federal
bankruptcy law. The court reasoned that, as a matter of general
federal common
law, a party may not recover its attorneys fees pursuant to a
contract or state
statute where the issues litigated involve matters of federal law
because only
federal law may authorize such a recovery. The question presented
is:
Should the Court grant certiorari to resolve a conflict among nine
courts of appeals
concerning whether a litigant may recover attorneys fees under a
contract or state
statute where the issues litigated involve matters of federal
bankruptcy law?
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket Sheet From the U.S. Supreme Court.
-
Northwestern University - Medill School of
Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Travelers Cas. & Surety Co.:
G.
Eric Brunstad Jr.
Bingham
McCutchen, LLP
Hartford, CT
For Respondent PG&E:
Gary
M. Kaplan
Howard
Rice Nemerowski Canady Falk & Rabkin
San Francisco, CA
Wednesday, January 17
Jalil Abdul-Kabir, fka Ted Calvin Cole v. Nathaniel
Quarterman, Director, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division
No. 05-11284
Brent Ray Brewer v. Nathaniel Quarterman, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division
No. 05-11287
Subject:
Capital Sentencing, Death Penalty, Jury Instructions, Penry
v. Johnson, Mental Disorders, Mitigation, Mitigating
Evidence
Questions:
- Do the former Texas special issue capital sentencing jury
instructions which
permit jurors to register only a yes or no answer to two
questions, inquiring
whether the defendant killed deliberately and probably would
constitute a
continuing threat to society permit constitutionally
adequate consideration of
mitigating evidence about a defendants mental impairment and
childhood
mistreatment and deprivation, in light of this Courts
emphatic statement in Smith
v.
Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 48 (2004), that those same two
questions had little, if
anything, to do with Smiths evidence of mental impairment
and childhood
mistreatment)?
- Do this Courts recent opinions in Penry
v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry
II) and Smith, both of which require instructions that
permit jurors to give full
consideration and full effect to a defendants mitigating
evidence in choosing the
appropriate sentence, preclude the Fifth Circuit from
adhering to its prior decisions
antedating Penry II and Smith that reject Penry error
whenever the former
special issues might have afforded some indirect
consideration of the defendants
mitigating evidence?
- Has the Fifth Circuit, in insisting that a defendant show as
a predicate to relief
under Penry that he suffers from a mental disorder that is
severe, permanent or
untreatable, simply resurrected the threshold test for
constitutional relevance that
this Court emphatically rejected in Tennard
v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004)?
- Where the prosecution, as it did here, repeatedly implores
jurors to follow the
law and do their duty by answering the former Texas special
issues on their own
terms and abjuring any attempt to use their answers to
effect an appropriate
sentence, is it reasonably likely that jurors applied their
instructions in a way that
prevented them from fully considering and giving effect to
the defendants mitigating
evidence?
Decisions:
Resources:
- Docket Sheet From the U.S. Supreme
Court.
-
Northwestern University - Medill School of
Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioners Abdul-Kabir and Brewer:
Robert C. Owen
Owen & Rountree, L.L.P.
Austin, TX
For Respondent Quarterman:
Edward L. Marshall
Office of the Attorney General of
Texas
Austin, TX
LaRoyce Lathair Smith v. Texas
No. 05-11304
Subject:
Capital Sentencing, Death Penalty, Penry
v. Johnson, Mitigation, Mitigating Evidence
Question:
- In Smith
v.
Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004), this Court summarily
reversed the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and found
constitutional error under Penry
v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S.302 (1989) (Penry I), and Penry
v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry II). Is
it consistent with this Courts remand in this case for
the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals to deem the error in petitioners case
harmless based on its view
that jurors were in fact able to give adequate
consideration and effect to petitioners
mitigating evidence notwithstanding this Courts
conclusion to the contrary?
- Can the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, based on a
procedural determination that
it declined to adopt in its original decision that this
Court then summarily reversed,
impose on remand a daunting standard of harm (egregious
harm) to the
constitutional violation found by this Court?
Decisions:
Resources:
-
Docket Sheet From the U.S.
Supreme Court.
-
Northwestern University - Medill
School of Journalism: On the Docket
Briefs:
Parties
Counsel of Record
For Petitioner Smith:
Jordan Steiker
Austin, TX
For Respondent Texas :
R. Ted Cruz
Solicitor General
Office of the Attorney General
Austin, TX
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