Everson v. Board of Education (1947)
Background
The United States Supreme Court first applied the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the states in Everson v. Board of Education. This case involved a taxpayer challenge to a state statute which authorized local boards of education to arrange for the transportation of children to and from public and non-profit schools. Under this statute, the board in the taxpayer's township passed a resolution to reimburse parents for bus fares paid by their children on regular public transit buses while traveling to and from public and Catholic schools. The taxpayer alleged that the reimbursement plan violated the Constitution because it supported Catholic schools, which provide religious instruction.
A state court found "that the legislature was without power to authorize such payment under the State constitution." On appeal, the "New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals reversed, holding that neither the statute nor the resolution passed pursuant to it was in conflict with the State constitution or the provisions of the Federal Constitution in issue." The plaintiff-taxpayer then appealed that decision.
Issue
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the state statute and the board of education resolution violated the Federal Constitution in that they authorized reimbursement of bus fares to parents of children attending parochial schools. The Court viewed this as a two-part inquiry. First, does the use of taxes taken from one private party for the benefit of another private party violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Secondly, does the use of taxes to reimburse parents for transportation expenses incurred by their children while traveling to and from parochial schools violate the First Amendment, which the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the states?
Permissible Use of Taxes
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the court.
The Court acknowledged that in rare instances, it had "struck down state statutes on the ground that the purpose for which tax-raised funds were to be expended was not a public one." However, the Court warned that this power must be exercised with "the most extreme caution," or else "a state's power to legislate for the public welfare might be seriously curtailed...."
Here, the Court declared that "[i]t is much too late to argue that legislation intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular education serves no public purpose." "The same thing is no less true of legislation to reimburse needy parents, or all parents, for payment of the fares of their children so that they can ride in public busses to and from schools rather than run the risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or 'hitchhiking.'" "Nor does it follow that a law has a private rather than a public purpose because it provides that tax-raised funds will be paid to reimburse individuals on account of money spent by them in a way which furthers a public program." Indeed, the Court noted that the subsidies and loans to farmers, home owners, privately owned transportation systems, and many other kinds of businesses "have been commonplace practices in our state and national history".
Establishment Clause
To interpret the First Amendment, the Court first reviewed its historical background. The Court noted the damage inflicted upon the people in the old world as different religious faiths battled for political and religious supremacy. To prevent the turmoil, strife and persecutions from poisoning the new nation, the people "reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group." This determination first resulted in the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, which was originally drafted by Thomas Jefferson, and later the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The Court then declared, "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State.'"
However, the Court recognized the tensions inherent in these principles. While New Jersey cannot "contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church," it also "cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude...members of any...faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." Accordingly, "we cannot say that the First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending taxraised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools."
The Court admitted that the reimbursement plan helped children attend parochial schools. The Court further stated that some parents might not send their children to parochial schools but for the reimbursement plan. However, the Court likened the reimbursement plan to the provision of other local government services, such as police and fire protection, sewage disposal, and local sidewalks and roads, which indisputably aid parochial schools, but do not violate the First Amendment. "That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them."
More significantly, the Court found that the "State contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court decision, concluding that the wall between church and state was not breached here.
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